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  Key exchange protocols allow
establish a common secret key called a session key. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman proposed the first 
practical key exchange (DH key exchange) protocol.  In
new variation  of the computational   DH assumption  called chosen based computational Diffie Hellman 
(CCDH)  and presented  simple password based authenticated  key exchange protocols.  Since then 
several three party password  authenticated key agreement  protocols  have  been proposed  In 2007, 
Lu and  Cao proposed  a simple 3 party authenticated  key exchange  (S
Koi found  that this protocol cannot  resist  undetectable   online 
fixed STPKE’ protocol as a countermeasure  using exclusive
Padmavathy found that STPKE’ is
gave a modified STPKE’ protocol.  Unfortunately,   we find that, although  modified STPKE’ protocol  can  
resist  undetectable   online  password  guessing  attack   but it is vulnerable  to man  in the middle  
attack.  Also, we propose and analyze an
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1. Introduction 
With  the  invention of world wide web and its rapid  spread,  the  need for 
authentication and  secure  communication   became  still  more  acute.   Key 
protocols allow 2 or more parties communicating over
secret key called a session key.   In 1976, 
key exchange protocol.   However DH protocol does not provide   authentication   
suffers from man in the middle  attack.  To over come this problem, many authenticated   key 
exchange protocols, based  
Since the password based authenticated   key exchange protocols, require user to remember 
only human memorable passwords, without any
quite simple and efficient. 
Password based authenticat
pass- word guessing attacks [3] since users usually choose easy
In general, the password  guessing attacks  can be divided into three  classes:
Detectable on-line password guessi
password  in an on-line transaction.   He/ she verifies the  correctness of his/her guess using 
the response from server.  A failed guess can be detected  and logged by the server.
Undetectable on-line password guessing attacks:
verify  a password  guess in an  online  transaction.  However, a failed  guess cannot  be 
detected  and logged by server, as the server is not able to distinguish  an honest request.
Off-line password guessing attacks:
guess off-line. No participation   of server is required,  so the server does not notice the attack 
from a malicious one. 
Due to practical  significance many  password  authe
pro- tocols have been proposed. In 1992, Bellovin and  Merrit [2] proposed  the first,  two 
party password  authenticated   key exchange protocol (2PAKE)  where two communicating 
parties Alice and  Bob share  low entropy pass
1994, Steiner  [4] extended  the concept  to 3 party  (STW3PEKE)  with a  trusted server  S 
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and clients  A and  B. In (1995) Ding and Horster [3] and  Sun  et  al.  [5] showed  that Steiner 
et  al’s 3PAKE  protocol  is vulnerable  to  undetectable   on line password  guessing  attacks. 
In (2000) Lin et al. [6] also showed that STW3PEKE   suffers not  only undetectable   online 
password  guessing attacks  but also off-line password  guessing attacks. Moreover, they  
pre- sented a new LSH-3PEKE  protocol using server’s public key. Lin et al. [7]  (2001) 
presented LSSH-3PEKE  resistant to both  off-line and undetectable on line password 
guessing attacks without  using server public  keys.  In (2004) Chang  and  Chang  [8] gave 
LHL-3PEKE  with round  efficient version.  In the same year Lee et al. [9] presented  two 
enhanced  three party encrypted  key exchange  protocols  without  using public  key 
techniques. In 2005, Abdalla and Pointcheval [10] suggested a new variation  of the 
computational   DH assumption,  called chosen-based  computational   Diffie-Hellman and 
presented  SPAKE-1 and SPAKE-2,  simple password  based authenticated   key exchange 
protocols. 
In 2007, Lu and Cao [11] proposed a simple 3 party authenticated key exchange 
protocol (S-3PAKE) based  on the concept  of Abdalla  and  Pointcheval. They  claimed  that 
their protocol  is superior  to similar protocols  with respect  to security and efficiency. But  
unfor- tunately, works of Nam et al., [12] Chung  and Ku [13] Chen  and Jin  [14] and Guo Hua 
et al. [15] showed that S-3PAKE  suffers from various  attacks  like off-line dictionary  attack, 
man in the middle attack,  impersonation  of initiator  attack  and impersonation  of responder 
attack.   In 2009, Kim and Choi [16] showed that S-3PAKE cannot  resist undetectable  online 
password  guessing attack  also and  presented  fixed STPKE’  as a countermeasure by using 
exclusive or operation.  Recently,  Tallapally  and Padmavathy [17] found that fixed STPKE’ is 
still vulnerable  to  undetectable   on-line password  guessing attack,   if the identity of the 
client is exposed.  They  proposed  an alternative   protocol  by modifying STPKE’. 
Unfortunately,  we find that modified STPKE’ protocol although  is resistant to undetectable  
online password guessing attack  but cannot  withstand man in the middle attack. We also 
propose an efficient  key exchange  protocol  and  show that it can withstand   all the  known 
attacks. We also validate  the proposed  protocol  using  AVISPA tool  (Automated   validation  
of internet  security protocols  and  applications)  which is a push  button  tool for the 
automated validation  of security protocols. 
The  rest  of the  paper  is organized  as follows.  In Section  2 we review S-3PAKE,  
fixed STPKE’  and modified STPKE’ protocols.  In Section 3 we discuss man in the middle 
attack on modified STPKE’ protocol.  Section 4 gives the proposed protocol.  The security 
analysis of the protocol along with its formal verification  and validation  is discussed in 
Sections 5 & 6. Finally  the paper  is concluded in Section 7 
 
 
2. Review of password based protocols 
2.1.  Review of  Lu and Cao’s   (S-3PAKE) protocol. 
 In 2007, Lu and  Cao proposed a simple three-party key exchange  (S-3PAKE)  
protocol  based  on the  chosen-basis  computational  Diffie-Hellman (CCDH)  assumption.  
They  claimed  that their protocol  can resist various attacks  and is superior  to similar 
protocols  with respect  to efficiency. 
 
The notations  used in the protocol  are described  as follows: 
(G, g, p):  A finite cyclic group G generated  by an element g with prime order p. 
M, N: Two elements  in G. 
S: A trusted server. 
 A, B: Two clients. 
P wA  : The password  shared  between  A and S. 
P wB : The password  shared  between  B and S.  
H, H′   : Two secure one way hash functions. 
x, y, z: Random  numbers  selected by A, B and S. 
 
 The steps of the protocol  can be briefly described  as shown in figure 1. 
Step 1:  A chooses a random number x ∈ Zp  and computes  U = gx.M PwA   and sends A|| U 
to B. 
Step 2:  B also chooses a random  number  y ∈ Zp  and  computes  V = gy .NPwB    and  sends 
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A || U|| B || V  to S. 
Step 3:  Upon receiving A|| U || B ||  V , S uses PwA and PwB  to compute  gx = U/M PwA and 
gy  = V/N PwB . Then  S chooses another  random  number  z ∈ Zp  and computes  gxz  = 
(gx)z  and gyz  = (gy )z .  Finally S computes  U′ = gyz .H (A, S, gx)PwA   and V′ = gxz .H (B, 
S, gy )PwB 
Step 4:  B, on receiving U′ || V′, uses PwB  to compute  gxz  = V ′ / H (B, S, gy )PwB   and uses 
the random  number  y to compute  gxyz  = (gxz )y  and α= H (B, A, gxyz ).  B forwards U′|| α to 
A. 
Step  5: A computes gyz = U′ /H (A, S, gx)PwA   and  uses x to  compute gxyz 
=(gyz) x  and verifies α.  If the verification fails, A terminates the protocol, otherwise  
A computes  the session key SKA = H′ (A, B, gxyz ) and sends β = H ′ (A, B, gxyz ) 
to B. 
Step 6:  B verifies β.  If it holds, B computes the session key SKB = H′ (A, B, gxyz ). 
 
 
 
and sends U′ || V′   to B. 
Step 4:  B, on receiving U′    || V′, uses pwB  to compute  gxz  = V ′ / H (B, S, gy )pwB   and 
uses 
the random  number  y to compute  gxyz  = (gxz )y  and α= H (B, A, gxyz ).  B forwards U′|| α to 
A. 
Step  5: A computes gyz = U′ /H (A, S, gx)pwA   and  uses x to  compute gxyz 
=(gyz) x  and verifies α.  If the verification  fails, A terminates   the protocol,  
otherwise  A computes  the 
session key SKA = H′ (A, B, gxyz ) and sends β = H ′ (A, B, gxyz ) to B. 
 
 
 
Step 6:  B verifies β.  If it holds, B computes  the session key SKB = H′ (A, B, gxyz ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
Figure1.  Lu and Cao’s S-3PAKE  protocol 
 
 
2.2  Review of Kim and Choi’s STPKE’ protocol. 
 Kim an Choi found that, S-3PAKE protocol  is vulnerable  to  undetectable   online  
password  guessing  attack   by  using  formal description  and  proposed  an alternative,   
fixed simple three party  key exchange  (STPKE’) protocol  by using an extra  random  
number  and exclusive OR operation. The following are the steps of the protocol: 
Step 1a:  A chooses 2 random numbers  x, a ∈ Zp  and  computes  U=  (gx ⊕ ga ).M PwA   
and 
A′ = A.ga  and sends A′ || U to 
B. 
Step 1b: B chooses random  numbers  y, b ∈ Zp  and computes  V=  (gy ⊕ gb ).N PwB , and 
B′ = 
B.gb  and sends A′ || U || B′ V  to S. 
Step  2a:   Upon  receiving  A′ || U || B′ V ,  S finds ga   = A′ /A,  gb  = B′ /B,  gx ⊕ ga   = U/M 
PwA , gx=  (gx ⊕ ga ) ⊕ ga , gy ⊕ gb = V /N PwB , gy = (gy  ⊕ gb ) ⊕ gb , chooses a random 
public information : G, g, 
p, M, N, H 
U ser A U ser B ServerS 
                                
                           A||U                                                    A||U||B||V       
U ← gx.M PwA  V  ← gy .N PwB         
                                                                                                             gx ← U/M PwA , gxz  ← (gx)z  
                                                                                                              gy ← V /N PwB , gyz  ← (gy )z 
                                                                                                           U′
   
← gyz .H (A, S, gx)PwA 
                                                                                                              
V ′
   
← gxz .H (B, S, gy )PwB
 
                                                                                U′||V′                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                
gxz  ← V′
 
/H (B, S, gy )PwB
 
α ← H (B, A, gxyz )
 
                                                                   U′ || α 
gyz  ← U′
 
/H (A, S, gx)PwA              
 
              verif y : α                                      
                          
β
 
β ← H (A, B, gxyz )                          verif y : β 
    SKA  ← H′(A, B, gxyz  )                               SKB ← H ′A, B, gxyz  )
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number  z ∈ Zp  and computes  gxz = (gx)z  and gyz = (gy )z . 
Step 2b: Finally, S computes U′ = gyz .H (A′ , B′ , S, gx)PwA   and V ′ = gxz .H (B′ , A′ , S, gy) 
PwB and sends U ′  ||V ′   to B. 
Step  3a: Upon  receiving  U ′  ||V ′  from S, B computes  gxz = V′ / H (B′ , A′ , S, gy )PwB  and 
uses y to compute  gxyz = (gxz )y . Then B computes  α= H (B′ , A′ , gxyz ) and forwards U′  
||α to A. 
Step 3b: Upon receiving U′  ||α  from B, A computes  gyz = U′ /H (A′ , B′ , S, gx)PwA   and 
uses x to  compute  gxyz = (gyz )x. A verifies α = H (B′ , A′ , gxyz ).  If the verification holds,  A 
computes β = H (A′ , B′, gxyz ) and  the session key SKA = H ′ (A′ , B′, gxyz ) and  forwards  β 
to B. 
Step 3c:  B computes  H (A′ , B′ , gxyz ) and  verifies β. If the  verification  holds B computes 
the session key SKB = H ′ (A′ , B′ , gxyz ).  Figure  2. illustrates  STPKE’ protocol. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
                          
  
Figure 2.  Kim and Choi’s fixed STPKE’ protocol 
 
 
2.3. Review of modified STPKE’ protocol.  
Recently  Tallapally  and Padmavathy proposed a modified simple three party key 
exchange protocol (modified STPKE’)  to overcome the undetectable   password  guessing 
attack  on Kim and  Choi’s (STPKE’)  protocol  and  S-3PAKE protocol proposed by Lu and 
Cao.  They made the values of M and N secret between client and server as against  the 
public information  in S-3PAKE  protocol  and used parallel sessions for message 
transmission.   The following are the detailed  steps of the protocol. 
U ser A                               U ser B                               Server S 
 
x, a  ∈ Zp 
U ← (gx ⊕ ga ).M PwA 
                       
   A′ ||U                      y, b ∈ Zp 
A′
   
← A.ga  
    
V  ← (gy ⊕ gb ). N PwB 
                                                                   A′|| U|| B′ ||V
   
                                        
B ′
   
← B.gb 
        
ga  ← A′
 
/A,
 
gb ← B ′
 
/B
  
                                                                                 
gx ⊕ ga  ← U/M PwA  
gx ← (gx ⊕ ga ) ⊕ ga
 
gxz  ← (gx)z
 
gy ⊕ gb ← V /N PwB
 
gy ← (gy ⊕ gb ) ⊕ gb
 
gyz  ← (gy )z           
                  U′
   
← gyz . H (A′ , B ′ , S, gx)PwA 
                                                                                                                  V   ← gxz.H (B′ , A′ , S, gy)PwB 
                                                                                                  U′ || V′   
                                                                                                                                                        
gxz  ← V ′
 
/H (B′ , A′ , S, gy )PwB 
gxyz  ← (gxz )y
 
gyz  ←U′
 
/H (A′ , B ′ , S, gx)PwA          α ← H (A′
 
, B′
 
, gxyz ) 
verif y : α                                                                  U′ || α                                    
                             
β
                
β ← H (A′ , B′ , gxyz )            verif y : β          
 
SKA← H′(A′, B ′, gxyz )       SKB←H′(A′,B ′,gxyz)                                                                        
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Step 1a:  A chooses a random number x ∈ Zp and computes U=  gx.MPwA  and sends A|| U 
to S. 
Step 1b: B also chooses a random number y ∈ Zp and computes V= gy.NPwB and sends B|| 
V to S. 
Step 2a:  Upon receiving A|| U and B|| V , S uses PwA  and PwB  to compute  gx = U/M PwA 
and gy  = V/N PwB . 
Step 2b: Then S chooses a random number  z ∈ Zp and  computes gxz = (gx)z   and  gyz = 
(gy )z   Finally  S computes  U ′ = gyz .H (A, S, gx)PwA and  V ′ = gxz .H (B, S, gy )PwB   and  
sends U′    to A and V ′   to B. 
Step 3a:  B on receiving V ′,uses PwB  to compute  gxz  = V′ / H (B, S, gy )PwB   and  uses the 
random  number  y to compute  gxyz  = (gxz )y  and α= H (B, A, gxyz ) and forwards α to A. 
Step 3b:  Upon receiving U′ , A computes  gyz  = U ′ /H (A, S, gx)PwA   and uses x to compute 
gxyz = (gyz )x and  verifies α. If the verification fails, A terminates the protocol, otherwise A 
computes  the session key SKA = H′ (A, B, gxyz ) and sends β = H (A, B, gxyz ) to B. 
Step 3c:  B verifies β.  If it holds, B computes  the session key SKB = H′ (A, B, gxyz ).  Figure 
3. illustrates modified STPKE’ protocol. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                               Figure3.  Modified STPKE’ protocol 
 
 
3.   Man in the middle attack on Modified STPKE’ protocol 
Padmavathy is vulnerable to man in the middle attack. We assume that an attacker  C 
is registered  with  the  trusted server S, shares  password  P WC  and  an element Q ∈ G with 
S and thus is able to set up normal  protocol  sessions with other  clients. 
Step 1a: A chooses a random number x ∈ Zp , and computes U= gx.M PwA and sends  
A|| U toS. 
Step1b: The attacker C records the message A || U ,choose a random  number l∈ Zp and 
Public  information: G, g, p, H 
inf ormation   shared between
 
client and server: P wA, P wB, M, N 
User A                                                             User B                                                                     Server S 
U ←gx.M PwA                                         V  ← gy .N PwB                                  
                                          A || U     
                                              B || V 
                                                                    
 gx ← U/M PwA , gxz  ← (gx)z                               
              gy ← V /N PwB , gyz  ← (gy )z
 
U′
   
← gyz .H (A, S, gx)PwA
 
V′
   
← gxz .H (B, S, gy )PwB
 
                                                                        U′                                                                                                                           
         gyz  ← U′
 
/H (A, S, gx)PwA                              
   
                                                                                     V′                                                                                                
                                                                                         
                                                                                                                             
                                                             gxz  ← V ′
 
/H (B, S, gy )PwB                                                             
 α ← H (B, A, gxyz ) 
        gxyz  ← (gxz )y 
   verif y : α                                   α 
                      
                                                          
                                                                        
β  ← H (A, B, gxyz )              β                       verif y : β 
            
SKA  ← H′(A, B, gxyz  )                               SKB ← H ′A, B, gxyz  )
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computes  W = gl .QpwC  and sends C|| W to S. (Q ∈ G) is shared  between C and S. 
Step1c: B chooses a random number y ∈ Zp ,computes  V  = gy .N PwB and sends B|| V  to S. 
Step 2a: Upon receiving C|| W and B|| V, S computes gl= W/QPwC and gy = V /N PwB . 
Step 2b:  Then  S chooses a random  number  z ∈ Zp  to compute  glz  = (gl )z  and gyz  = (gy) 
z and  then  S computes  W′    = gyz .H (C, S, gl )PwC and  V′=  glz .H (B, S, gy ) PwB    and  
sends W′ to C and V ′  to B. 
Step 3a:  Upon receiving V′, B uses PwB to compute  glz  = V ′/H (B, S, gy )PwB   and then 
uses y to compute  glzy  = (glz )y . Now, B sends α= H (B, A, glyz ) to A to establish  secret 
session key. 
Step 3b: The attacker   C receives α, uses PwC  to  compute  gyz  = W′ /H (C, S, gl )PwC   and 
then uses l to compute  glzy  = (gyz )l , computes  α from H (B, A, glyz ) (C gets the identity of B 
by attacking B || Y  sent by user B to S) and verifies the received and computed  values. If they 
are same, computes  β = H (A, B, glyz ) and sends it to B impersonating  as A. C also calculates  
the  session key SKA  = H′(A, B, glyz ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Man in the middle attack on Modified STPKE’protocol 
 
 
Step  3c:   B  verifies  β  and  authenticates A.  B  also  computes   the  session  key  SKB  = 
H′(A, B, glyz ). 
 
Thus, an attacker C can successfully impersonate user A and establish secret session key with 
B as shown in Figure 4. This session key can be used for all communications with B. 
 
 
4.  Proposed protocol 
 In this Section we propose an efficient three party key exchange protocol which can 
resist all the known attacks.   For this purpose we break the password into two parts.  Assume 
that two communicating parties A and B wish to agree a common session key.  Let PwA be the 
Attacker C                                                     U ser B                               Server S
 
                                                                                   V  ← gy .N PwB 
 
             A  || U  
(recorded   f rom   A)                              B || V 
   W ← gl .QPwC                              
                                                 C || W 
                                                              
gl ← W/QPwC , gy ← V /N PwB
 
glz  ← (gl )z , gyz  ← (gy )z
 
W′
   
← gyz .H (C, S, gl )PwC 
W′
 
                                                                          V ′
   
← glz .H (B, S, gy )PwB 
                                                                        V ′ 
                                                                  
gyz  ← W′
 
/H (C, S, gl )PwC             glz  ← V ′  /H (B, S, gy )PwB
 
     glzy  ← (gyz )l                                                        glzy  ← (glz )y
 
                                                    α ← H (B, A, glyz ) 
                                                  α 
   verif y : α                         
β  ← H (A, B, glyz )              β                       verif y : β 
            
 
SKA  ← H′(A, B, glyz  )                               SKB ← H ′A, B, glyz  )
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password shared between A and server S which is an arbitrary   bit   string.  Here, A stores (PA 
, P1 ), while the server stores (PA , NA ), where NA  = gP1  and (PA , P1 ) = H (PwA , A, B). 
Similarly PwB  be the password  shared  between  B and  S. Again,  B stores  (PB , P2 ), while 
the server stores (PB , NB ), where NB = gP2  and (PB , P2 ) = H (PwB , A, B). Clients   A and B 
can derive (PA , P1) and (PB , P2) from PwA  and PwB  respectively. The following are the 
steps of the protocol. 
Step 1:  A chooses a random number  x ∈RZq  and  computes U ← gx ⊕ H (PA, A, B)  and 
sends  (U|| A)to  B. 
Step 2:  B also chooses a random   number   y ∈RZq   and  computes  V  ← gy ⊕ H (PB , B, A) 
and sends (U || A), (V  || B) to S. 
Step 3:  Upon  receiving  (U  || A) and(V || B),  S uses PA   and  PB  to  compute  gx  ← U ⊕ H 
(PA, A, B)  and  gy  ← V  ⊕ H (PB , B, A) respectively.  Then  S chooses a random  number z 
∈RZq  to compute gxz ← (gx)z , gyz  ← (gy )z  (NA )z , (NB )z .Finally, S computes U ′′   ←gyz 
⊕ H (PA , A, B, gx, (NA )z ) and  V ′  ← gxz  ⊕ H (PB , B, A, gy , (NB )z ) and  sends (U′ || gz ) ( 
V′ || gz ) to B. 
Step 4:  B, on receiving the message uses P2   to   calculate  (NB )z   ← (gz )P2   and  
computes gxz  ← V′   ⊕ H (PB , B, A, gy , (NB )z ) and  authenticates S. Now, B uses y to 
compute  K  ←gxyz , α ← H (B, A, K ) and forwards U′ || gz || α to A. 
Step  5:   A, on receiving  the  message  from  B,  uses P1   to  compute  (NA )z   ← (gz )P1   
and gyz ← U′  ⊕ H (PA , A, B, gx, (NA )z ) and authenticates the server. Then A uses x to 
compute K  ← gxyz  and  checks  whether α ← H (B, A, K )  holds  or  not.  If it  does  not  hold,  
A terminates   the  protocol, otherwise A is convinced  that K is the  valid  session key. Then A 
computes  β  ← H (A, B, K )  and  forwards  it to  B.  Also,  A computes  the  session Key SKA  
← H ′(A, B, K ). 
Step 6:  Upon receiving β, B computes   β ← H (A, B, K ) and verifies whether  computed  β is 
equal to the received β. If both are equal then B authenticates A and computes  the session 
key SKB ← H′(A, B, K ) 
 
 
5.  Security Analysis 
 In this Section we analyze the security and efficiency of the proposed  protocol. 
1.  Trivial  attacks:  Computing  the session key from the transmitted  messages α or β,  is 
impossible  due  to  the one-wayness of hash  function. Also, for computing it from other 
transmitted   messages U or V an attacker has to face the  difficulty of discrete  logarithm 
problem.  So, our protocol  is resistant to trivial attack. 
2.  Password guessing attacks:   Suppose an attacker  or a malicious user B try to guess A’s 
password as P′A , generates gx′  ← U ⊕ H(P′A, A,B) and sends it to the server S in online 
transaction   in step 2 of our protocol.  To verify the correctness of his guessed password  he 
needs to compute gyz ← U ′ ⊕H (PA, A, B, gx, (NA )z ) and gxz  ← V ′ ⊕H (PB , B, A, gy , (NB 
)z ) which is impossible as  
he needs the values of P1 and  P2  for computing  (NA )z  and  (NB )z  Similarly remaining  off-
line also, using the transferred messages U, V, U′ , V′ , gz , an attacker cannot  verify the 
correctness  of his guessed password. 
3. Man in the middle attack:   In step 3 of our protocol, S authenticates the 2 communicating 
parties A and B from the messages U ← gx ⊕ H (PA , A, B) and V ← gy ⊕ H (PB , B, A) sent  
by B. A and B authenticate S, from U′  ← gyz ⊕H (PA, A, B, gx, (NA )z ) and  V′  ← gxz  ⊕ H 
(PB , B, A, gy , (NB )z ) as PA , PB  are  known  only to  S. Finally, A authenticates B from α ← 
H (A, B, K). Thus, in each step of our protocol each party authenticates the other communicating 
party and hence there is no scope for man in the middle attack. 
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Figure 5.  Proposed protocol 
 
 
4. Replay attack: Since one way hash function is used, our proposed protocol is invulnerable to 
this attack. 
5. Forgery attacks: In case the server is compromised, the attacker is required to compute gx 
←U⊕ H (PA , A, B) and  gy ← V ⊕ H (PB , B, A)  where PA  and PB  are the passwords of A 
and B respectively. However it is not possible to compute these values without the knowledge of 
the passwords and hence A and B cannot construct the common session key. 
6. Perfect forward secrecy: In case, the passwords  PA and PB of the users A and B are 
compromised, 
the attacker cannot calculate the session key as P1 and P2 are unknown. These values remain 
unknown even to the server and so there is no chance of any compromise. Also the session key 
is independent in each session and x, y, z are randomly chosen. 
 
 
6.  Formal Verification and Validation of Proposed Protocols 
6.1. AVISPA. 
We have validated   the security of the proposed  protocol  using  AVISPA tool.  
              User A                                                                        User B                                                                 Server S 
        
secret  : PA , P1                                                           secret  : PB , P2                                                               secret :                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                           PA , NA  = g
P1                                    
                                                                                                                                      PB , NB = gP2 
           x ←R Zq                                                                                    y ←R Zq 
U ← gx ⊕ H (PA , A, B)                                        V  ← gy ⊕ H (PB , B, A) 
                                            U||A                                                                      V||B 
                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                                      z ←R Zq 
                                                                                                         
gx ← U ⊕ H (PA , A, B) 
                                                                                                       
gy ← V  ⊕ H (PB , B, A) 
                                                                                                               
gxz  ← (gx)z
 
                                                                                                        
gyz  ← (gy )z                
                                      U′ 
  
← gyz ⊕ H (PA , A, B, gx, (NA )z ) 
                                                                                          
  
V′ 
 
← gxz  ⊕ H (PB , B, A, gy , (NB )z )                                                                     
                                            (U′||gz),(V′||gz) 
                                           
                                                                (NB )z  ← (gz )P2 
                                                 gxz  ← V′
  
⊕ H (PB , B, A, gy , (NB )z )                                                                  
                                                                        
K ← gxyz        
                                                                                         
α  
 
←H(B,  A, K)
          
                                                            
               
(U′||gz || 
α
 )                                                                                  
             
              
(NA )z  ← (gz )P1 
   
gyz  ← U′
   
⊕ H (PA , A, B, gx, (NA )z ) 
               
K ← gxyz
 
           verif y : α 
                                               
β
 
β ← H (A, B, K )            verif y : β
 
SKA  ← H′(A, B, K )          SKB ← H ′A, B, K )
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Automated validation of internet security protocols and applications  (AVISPA)  [18 ]is a push 
button  tool for the automated   validation  of security protocols.  A modular  and expressive 
formal language  called HLPSL (High level protocols  specification  language)  [19] is used  by 
AVISPA to  specify the  security protocol  and  their properties.   HLPSL  is a role- based 
language,  meaning  that we first specify the sequence of actions of each kind of protocol 
participant in a module,  which is called a basic role.  This  specification  can later  be 
instantiated   by one or more agents  playing  the  given role, and  we further specify how the 
resulting  participants   interact  with one another  by combining multiple  basic roles together 
into  a  composed  role.   HLPSL  specification  is translated   into  the Intermediate  Format 
(IF),  using  hlpsl2if.   The IF specification  is then processed  by model-checkers  to  analyze if 
the security goals are violated.   There  are four different  verification  back  end tools use to  
analyze  the  IF  specification  namely,  OFMC  (  On-the-Fly   Model-Checker),   CL-AtSe 
(Constraint-Logic-based   Attack Searcher), SATMC  (SAT-based  Model-Checker),  TA4SP  ( 
Tree  Automata-based   Protocol  Analyser).   Possible flaws in a protocol  can  be identified 
using these back end tools.  As, exponential  and XOR operations  are supported  by CL-AtSe 
and  OFMC  back ends we use OFMC  back end tool with  AVISPA and  SPAN  (Animation 
tool for AVISPA)  to analyze the proposed  protocols. 
 
6.2. Specification and Verification of Proposed Protocol.  
We verified the security of proposed  protocol  using  AVISPA. For  this we define three 
basic  roles played  by Alice (A),  Bob (B)  and  Server (S). P WA  and  P WB  are the  
passwords  of A and  B where P WA = (PA,P1) and P WB  = (PB,  P2).  PA and PB are shared  
with S and hence represent the symmetric  keys. P1 and P2 remain  secret with A and B as 
their  private  keys. S shares NA = exp(G,P1)  with A and NB = exp(G,P2)  with B. Hence NA 
and NB are the public keys whose inverse is known only to A and  B respectively.  We then 
define the  composed roles describing  the  sessions of the  protocol  and  finally the top  level 
role ” environment  role”. For analyzing  the protocol  using AVISPA  tool the following 
notations  have been used. 
 
g → G(value  of g is stored  in G) 
x → X, y → Y 
z → Z, I DA → A 
I DB  → B 
The HLPSL specification for the proposed  protocol  is given below. 
%% PROTOCOL:   E3PKE protocol%% 
ALICE  BOB SERVER: 
%% Macros: 
%% FM1:  H(PA,  A, B, exp(G,X),  exp(NA,Z)),exp(G,Z) 
%% FM2:  H(PB,  A, B, exp(G,Y),  exp(NB,Z)),  exp(G,Z) 
%% Key:  exp(exp(GY,Z),X)   = exp(exp(GX,Z),Y) 
%% GX : exp(G,X) 
%% GY: exp(G,Y) 
%% U: xor(exp(G,X),H(PA,   A, B)) 
%% V: xor(exp(G,Y),H(PB,   B, A)) 
%% U′   : xor(exp(GY, Z ), F M 1) 
%% V′   : xor(exp(GX, Z ), F M 2) 
The following are the message transactions: 
%%1.A → B : U || A 
%%2.B → S : (U || A), (V || B) 
%%3.S → B : (U′   || exp(G, Z )), (V′   || exp(G, Z )) 
%%4.B → A : U′   || exp(G, Z ) || α 
%%5.A → B : β 
 
%% HLPSL: 
role alice( A,B,S : agent, SND,RCV  : 
channel(dy), H : hash  func, 
PA : symmetric  key, 
G : text) 
played  by A 
def= 
local State  : nat, X,Z 
: text, 
NA : public key, GY, 
Key : message, 
const sec m Key : protocol  id init 
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State  := 0 
transition 
1. State  = 0∧RCV(start)= | > 
State’:= 1 ∧ X’ := new() 
∧ SND( xor(exp(G,X’),H(PA.A.B))) 
2. State  = 1 ∧ RCV(xor(exp(GY’,Z’),H(PA.A.B.exp(G,X).exp(NA’,Z’))).exp(G,Z’)= | > 
State’:= 2 ∧ Key’ := exp(exp(GY’,Z’),X) 
∧ SND(H(A.B.  Key’)) 
∧ witness(A,B,key1,Key’) 
3. State  = 2 ∧ RCV(A.B.Key)  = | > 
State’:= 3 ∧ request(A,B,key,Key) 
∧ secret(Key,sec  m Key,A,B) 
end role 
role bob ( A,B,S : agent, 
SND,RCV  : channel(dy), H : 
hash  func, 
PA,PB : symmetric key, G 
:text) 
played  by B 
def= 
local State  : nat, 
X,Y,Z : text, GX,GY 
: message, NB 
:public key, Key 
:message, 
FM1:  hash(symmetric-key.agent.agent.message.message).message, FM2 
:hash(symmetric-key.agent.agent.message.message).message const sec v Key : 
protocol  id 
init State  := 0 
transition 
1. State  = 0 ∧ RCV(  xor(exp(G,X’),H(PA.A.B)))= | > 
State’:= 1 ∧ Y’ := new() 
∧ SND(xor(exp(G,X’),H(PA.A.B)).xor(exp(G,Y’),H(PB.A.B))) 
2. State  = 1 ∧ RCV(xor(exp(GY,Z’),FM1’).xor(exp(GX’,Z’),FM2’))= | > 
State’:= 2 ∧ SND( xor(exp(  GY,Z’),FM1’)) 
3. State  = 2 ∧ RCV(H(A.B.exp(exp(GX’,Z’),Y)))= | > 
State’:= 3 ∧ Key’ := exp(exp(GX’,Z’),Y) 
∧ SND(H(A.B.  Key’)) 
∧ request(B,A,key1,Key) 
∧ secret(Key,sec  v Key,B,A) 
∧ witness(B,A,key,Key’) 
end role 
role server ( A,B,S : agent, 
SND,RCV  : channel(dy), H : 
hash  func, 
PA,PB : symmetric key, G : 
text) 
played  by S 
def= 
local State  : nat, 
X,Y,Z : text, 
NA,NB : public key, 
GX,GY : message 
init State  := 0 
transition 
1. State  = 0 ∧ RCV(  xor(exp(G,X’),H(PA.A.B)).xor(exp(G,Y’),H(PB.A.B)))= | > 
State’:= 1 ∧ Z’ := new() 
∧ NA’ := new() 
∧ NB’ := new() 
∧ GY’ := new() 
∧ GX’ := new() 
∧ SND(xor(exp(GY’,Z’),H(PA.A.B.exp(G,X’).exp(NA’,Z’)).exp(G,Z’)). 
xor(exp(GX’,Z’),H(PB.A.B.exp(G,Y’).exp(NB’,Z’)).exp(G,Z’))) 
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end role 
role session( A,B,S : agent, H : 
hash  func, 
PA,PB : symmetric key, 
NA,NB :public key, 
G : text) 
def= 
local SND,RCV  : channel  (dy) 
composition 
alice(A,B,S,SND,RCV,H,PA,G) 
∧ bob(A,B,S,SND,RCV,H,PA,PB,G) 
∧ server(A,B,S,SND,RCV,H,PA,PB,G) 
end role 
role environment() 
def= 
consta,b,s  : agent, 
h : hash  func, 
key,key1 : protocol  id, 
pa,pb,pi  :symmetric  key, 
na,nb,ni  :public key, 
g : text 
intruder knowledge = a,b,s,g,h,pi,na,nb,ni 
composition 
session(b,a,s,h,pa,pb,na,nb,g) 
∧ session(i,b,s,h,pi,pb,ni,nb,g) 
∧ session(a,i,s,h,pa,pi,na,ni,g) 
end role 
goal 
authentication   on key 
authentication   on key1 
secrecy of sec m Key, sec v Key end 
goal 
environment() 
Running  the AVISPA tool on the proposed  protocol  returns the following output. 
 
 
% OFMC 
% Version of 2006/02/13 
SUMMAR
Y 
SAFE 
DETAILS 
BOUNDED  NUMBER  OF SESSIONS 
PROTOCOL 
C:\progra∼1\testsuite\results\Etpke.if 
GOAL 
as specified 
BACKEND 
OFMC 
COMMENTS  STATISTICS 
parseTime:  0.00s 
searchTime:  0.37s 
visitedNodes:  48 nodes 
depth:  7 plies 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
In  this  paper  we have  demonstrated man  in  the middle  attack   on  modified  
STPKE’ protocol proposed by Tallapally  and Padmavathy. We have also suggested a 
countermeasure, an efficient three party key exchange protocol and showed that it is more 
secure and efficient than the  existing protocols  and  can  resist  all the  known  attacks.    
Finally, we have  also validated  the  proposed  protocol  using AVISPA, an automated tool for 
the  verification  of security protocols. 
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